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TRENDS AND CHALLENGES
IN LAWYER REGULATION: THE IMPACT
OF GLOBALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY
Laurel S. Terry,* Steve Mark,** & Tahlia Gordon***
INTRODUCTION
In the technology field, “Moore’s law” states that capacity doubles
approximately every two years. 1 Arguably, a similar phenomenon now
exists with respect to developments in the legal profession.2 Seemingly
every time one turns around, the legal profession and its regulators are
facing new questions, new issues, and new pressures—in short, new
challenges. The pace of this change has increased, among other reasons,
because of globalization, because of technology, and because developments
that arise in one country often migrate to other countries.3 These
* Harvey A. Feldman Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State
Dickinson School of Law. The author would like to thank the Fordham University School of
Law’s colloquium on Globalization and the Legal Profession participants for their useful
discussion and questions and Adam Muchmore and Carole Silver for comments on the
Article. She would also like to thank the many regulators and academics who are cited in
our companion article and who graciously provided information about regulatory objectives
and other topics. She would like to thank Geoff Weyl for research assistance. Finally, she
would like to thank Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon for making her first article co-authorship
experience so pleasant.
** Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales, Australia.
*** Research and Projects Manager, Office of the Legal Services Commissioner of New
South Wales, Australia.
1. See Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, INTEL
(2005),
ftp://download.intel.com/museum/Moores_Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts_A_
Conversation_with_Gordon_Moore.pdf. For a brief discussion of the impact of technology
on lawyers, see Minutes of April 29–30, 2010 Meeting of the ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20, at 10–11, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/ethics_2020/apr_2010_minutes.authcheckdam.pdf (remarks of Alan Davidson,
Dir. of Pub. Policy, Google).
2. Although this Article refers to the “legal profession” and to “lawyers,” we recognize
that these terms can be misleading because of the different meanings these terms have in
different jurisdictions. See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text.
3. See Laurel S. Terry, A “How To” Guide for Incorporating Global and Comparative
Perspectives into the Required Professional Responsibility Course, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1135, 1138–46 (2007) (discussing the ways in which lawyer regulators and regulations in
one country affect other countries). For a concrete example of developments in one country
that are cited in others, compare the Australian and U.K. Alternative Business Structure
(ABS) developments with the recent lawsuits filed in federal courts in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut by the U.S. law firm of Jacoby and Meyers. These lawsuits
challenge state ethics rules that prohibit outside investment in law firms. See, e.g., Debra
Cassens Weiss, Jacoby & Meyers Sues to Overturn Bans on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law
Firms, A.B.A. J. (May 19, 2011, 6:43 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
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developments have affected not only the portion of the legal profession
sometimes referred to as “Big Law,” but also “Main Street” lawyers who
practice alone or in small firms, often in geographic locales far removed
from Big Law settings. 4 In addition to the impact on lawyers, globalization
has also had a profound impact on regulators and the regulation of the legal
profession. 5
The legal profession and its regulators currently must respond to a
number of new developments. As noted above, regulators must be prepared
to respond to regulatory developments in one jurisdiction that may have
spillover effects in the regulator’s jurisdiction. Examples of this type of
development are the U.K. and Australian rules that permit alternative
business structures (ABS) for law firms that allow nonlawyer ownership of
law firms, public issuance of shares in a law firm, or corporate ownership of
such firms, since these firms may have offices in multiple jurisdictions.
Regulators must also respond to market-based developments. An example
of this type of development is the growth in alternative litigation financing
(ALF) and third party investment in lawsuits. Regulators must also respond
to other globalization developments, including the ways in which legal
education has responded to a global, multidisciplinary world; the growing
influence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
economies; and the growth and management of large, often global law
firms, including the difficulties that can arise when conflicts rules and
regulations differ. Finally, regulators must respond to the impact of
technology on law practice and lawyer regulation, including the growth in
cloud computing, virtual law offices, and outsourcing.
These examples illustrate some of the concrete issues facing the legal
profession and its regulators, but are by no means an exhaustive list. 6 The
jacoby_meyers_sues_to_overturn_bans_on_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_firms/; see also
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v.
Justices of the Supreme Court of N.J., No. 3:11-cv-02866 (D.N.J. May 18, 2011), available
at http://legalaccessforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NJComplaint.pdf.
For a
conference intended to alert U.S. state supreme court justices about the ABS developments
elsewhere in the world, see The Future Is Here: Globalization and the Regulation of the
Legal Profession: Recent Global Legal Practice Developments Impacting State Supreme
Courts’ Regulatory Authority over the U.S. Legal Profession (May 26–27, 2009), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/conf_materials.
authcheckdam.pdf.
4. See generally Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation—
Responding to a Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501 (2009);
Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect on Lawyers
Practicing in Non-global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527 (2008).
5. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 3, at 1138–46.
6. Some of the additional lawyer regulatory issues that have arisen as a result of
globalization and technology include foreign lawyer recognition issues, the rise (and
regulation) of virtual law firms; the role of accreditation, including whether the ABA should
accredit foreign law schools; and the outsourcing of legal services. A number of these issues
are discussed in the “Preliminary Issues Outline” distributed by the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Preliminary Issues Outline (Nov. 19,
2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
ethics_2020/preliminary_issues_outline.authcheckdam.pdf. Additional detail is available in
the “Issues Papers” distributed by the Commission. See generally Priorities and Initiatives,
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examples also illustrate the fact that the practice of law is far more
advanced than the regulatory world. Moreover, the issues facing the legal
profession seem to be increasingly multifaceted, multidisciplinary, and
complex.
Although one might talk about specific issues that have arisen because of
globalization and technology, it is also possible to frame in a much broader
fashion the challenges facing the legal profession and its regulators.
Because lawyers around the world are subject to many of the same
globalization and technology forces, similar issues now arise in multiple
locations around the world. Accordingly, one can now speak of common
“trends” and challenges in lawyer regulation as regulators around the world
scramble to respond to similar developments.
This Article identifies six different types of challenges facing
contemporary lawyer regulators and analyzes some of the regulatory trends
that seem to be emerging in response to these issues. These six challenges
include the following:
(1) Who should regulate the legal profession? For example, should there
be a self-regulatory system or a co-regulatory system? Alternatively, are
lawyers simply service providers, the regulation of whom should be
included in general societal regulations?
(2) Who or what should be regulated? Should regulators continue to
focus on regulating lawyers or should they be attempting to regulate those
who provide “legal services,” whoever they happen to be?
(3) When should regulation occur: ex ante or ex post?
(4) Where should regulation occur? Our traditional system of lawyer
regulation and enforcement is geography-based, but this regulatory system
does not really match the reality in which legal practice is increasingly
virtual.
(5) How should regulation occur? For example, should regulation differ
depending on the size or sophistication of the client? Should a regulator use
a rules-based approach or an outcomes-based approach?
(6) Why should regulation occur?
The why question of regulation is arguably the most important one of all
because its answers could help shape one’s responses to the challenges
listed above, as well as to specific inquiries such as whether and how to
regulate ABS, ALF, virtual law offices, cloud computing, and some of the
developments identified in this colloquium and elsewhere. Because of its
importance, the why question is the subject of our companion article that
appears in this colloquium. 7 This Article, however, focuses on the six
questions identified above. By illustrating these six challenges and trends,
ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/priorities_policy.html (last visited Apr.
21, 2012).
7. The authors have written a companion article for this colloquium that specifically
focuses on the why of regulation and the need for regulatory objectives for the legal
profession. See Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark, & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory
Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012).
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we hope that lawyers and their regulators in a particular country will realize
that we are not alone in responding to the developments and challenges of
regulating the practice of law in the twenty-first century, and that it may be
worthwhile to examine the experiences of other countries to learn more
about their successes and failures.
I. INSTRUMENTS OF LAWYER REGULATION
It is useful to begin with a brief discussion about the nature of lawyer
regulation before examining the six current trends in lawyer regulation.
As David Wilkins noted almost two decades ago, lawyers are “regulated”
by many different entities and many different sources of law and norms. 8
These “regulators” include the traditional formal regulators who admit
lawyers to practice, discipline lawyers, and adopt rules of conduct. They
include those, such as state or federal legislatures, who do not necessarily
have this front-line responsibility but are nevertheless formal regulators
who use traditional regulatory tools such as laws and regulations.
Additionally, lawyers are subject to less formal or official sources of
regulation by malpractice insurance carriers, clients, the news media,
judges, professional organizations, NGOs such as the American Law
Institute, custom, and peer pressure, to name just a few.
Although there are many different types of regulators and many different
sources of regulation, when this Article refers to “lawyer regulation,” it is
referring to formal regulators who are responsible for issues related to
admissions, discipline, and lawyer conduct. With this understanding, we
now turn to a discussion of instruments of lawyer regulation.
Viewed from a global perspective, lawyer regulation provisions appear in
many different types of regulatory instruments. For example, lawyer
regulation is found in legislation, some of which may be professionspecific, such as the legal profession acts found in Canada, 9 Australia, 10 or
Germany. 11 Additionally or alternatively, legislation applicable to lawyers
may be found in legislative codes that have a broader application, such as
bankruptcy statutes or criminal statutes directed against money laundering.
Examples of the former kind of legislation include the U.S. bankruptcy
rules applicable to lawyers counseling debtors, and examples of the latter

8. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992);
see also Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of
Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2012) (discussing the way in which in-house
counsel policies for outside counsel serve as an additional source of regulation); Symposium,
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1996).
9. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (Can.).
10. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (Austl.).
11. Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung [BRAO] [Federal Lawyers’ Act], Aug. 1, 1959,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil III [BGBL. III], last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 6, 2010,
BGBL. I at 2515, art. 8 (Ger.) (A translation of an earlier version can be found at
http://www.brak.de/w/files/02_fuer_anwaelte/brao_engl_090615.pdf).

2012]

TRENDS IN LAWYER REGULATION

2665

are the U.K. rules on money laundering. 12 This type of legislation is more
likely to emanate from those who are not the legal profession’s primary
regulators. 13
Lawyer regulation may also appear in regulations as opposed to
legislation. These regulations are often adopted pursuant to a legislative
delegation. For example, in Germany, the regulatory bar association called
the Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer [Federal Bar Association] has adopted
binding regulations (the Berufsordnung) for the legal profession
(Rechstanwälte) pursuant to the authority granted to it by federal legislation
known as the BRAO. 14
A third method of regulation is through lawyer conduct rules, which are
sometimes called ethics rules or rules of professional conduct. In some
cases, the primary regulatory authority, such as state supreme courts in the
United States, adopt these rules.15 In other cases, there may be several
levels of delegation involved before one reaches the entity that adopts
lawyer conduct rules. For example, the 2007 U.K. Legal Services Act
(U.K. Act) created the Legal Services Board, which recently approved the
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) as a front-line regulator for solicitors
in England and Wales. 16 In 2011, the SRA adopted a new Handbook for
Solicitors; this Handbook includes a Code of Conduct that took effect on
October 6, 2011. 17
A fourth method of “regulation” comes in the form of Guidelines,
Guidance, Comments, or Commentary, which may or may not be binding.
For example, the October 2011 Code of Conduct for English solicitors
includes both rules and lengthy “guidance” provisions, 18 the Law Society of

12. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1330
(2010); Colin Tyre, Anti-money Laundering Legislation: Implementation of the FATF Forty
Recommendations in the European Union, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 69, 76–78.
13. See generally John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959
(2009) (citing numerous examples of federal regulation of lawyers); Laurel S. Terry, The
Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as
“Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 193–205 (describing national and
international provisions that regulate lawyers as one of the many kinds of service providers).
14. See BERUFSORDNUNG FÜR RECHTSANWÄLTE (BORA) (Nov. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.brak.de/w/files/02_fuer_anwaelte/berufsrecht/bora_stand_01.11.11.pdf (English
translation available at http://www.brak.de/w/files/02_fuer_anwaelte/berufsrecht/bora_engl_
stand_1_11_2011.pdf).
15. For links to the binding rules of conduct in U.S. states, see Charts Comparing
Professional Conduct Rules: As Adopted by States to ABA Model Rules, ABA, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2012).
16. See, e.g., Approved Regulators, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, http://www.legalservices
board.org.uk/can_we_help/approved_regulators/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(listing the regulators for solicitors, barristers, legal executives, licensed conveyancers, law
costs draftsmen, patent and trade mark attorneys, and notaries).
17. SRA Handbook, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/handbook/ (last
visited Apr. 21, 2012).
18. See, e.g., Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2011, Rule 4: Confidentiality and Disclosure,
SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/code-of-conduct/rule4.page (last
visited Apr. 21, 2012).
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Upper Canada has “commentary” to its Code of Conduct,19 and a number
of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted the comments to the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and treat them as interpretative tools, 20 while
others have refused to officially adopt the Comments (although they might
reprint them). 21
A fifth type of regulation can come in the form of regulations applicable
to the entity that regulates the legal profession. For example, a law society
or regulator might be subject to bylaws or other limitations, in addition to
the legislation (for example, a legal profession act) that created the entity.
The Law Society of Upper Canada, for example, must comply with both its
bylaws and the Legal Profession Act that created the Law Society.22
Sometimes the provisions that apply to the entity can be binding, as in the
case of an organization’s bylaws, but sometimes it might come in the form
of “soft law” pressures on a regulatory entity. 23
A sixth source of regulation is the jurisdiction’s constitution, treaty, or
foundational documents. Lawyer regulations (of any sort) that are
inconsistent with the jurisdiction’s foundational law may be struck down. 24
This has happened on numerous occasions in the United States and in the
EU. 25
19. See, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CAN., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (eff. Nov. 1, 2000,
rev. Nov. 22, 2011), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=10272.
20. See ABA, CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, SCOPE [14] (Oct. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/scope.authcheckdam.pdf
(“Many of the Comments use the term ‘should.’ Comments do not add obligations to the
Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules.”); ABA, CPR
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., STATE ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND COMMENTS (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter STATE ADOPTION OF
COMMENTS], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/
comments.authcheckdam.pdf (summarizing state-by-state the interpretative significance of
the Comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct).
21. See, e.g., STATE ADOPTION OF COMMENTS, supra note 20. For example, in Maine,
the Preamble, comments, and reporter’s notes are printed with the Rule, but are not part of
the rules adopted by the Court. Id. at 4–5.
22. See Bylaws, LAW SOC’Y UPPER CAN., http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=1070 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2012) (adopted pursuant to subsections 62 (0.1) and (1) of the Law Society
Act).
23. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its
2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 3, 6–7, 9 (describing the ways in which the
Financial Action Task Force’s non-binding recommendations have influenced binding
lawyer regulation and legislation throughout the world).
24. Lawyer regulations that are inconsistent with these instruments may be struck down,
depending on the nature of judicial review in the country. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court has struck down a number of lawyer regulations, finding them inconsistent with the
First Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution. See generally Cases on Lawyer
Advertising, ABA CENTER PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_ethics_in_lawyer_advertising/clear
inghouse.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
25. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (striking down
New Hampshire’s residency requirement because it was contrary to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (striking down
Arizona’s advertising rules as violative of the First Amendment); COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW
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These examples demonstrate that when one refers to “lawyer regulation,”
one must keep in mind that there are many different types of instruments in
which “lawyer regulation” might appear. Thus, when comparing regulation
from one country to another, one must be sure to consider whether one is
examining comparable instruments and approaches. Moreover, it is
difficult to speak of “lawyers” as if there were a single accepted definition
of that term. Some jurisdictions, such as those in the United States, use a
single term to refer to a broad range of legal professionals who perform
both litigation and transactional work. 26 Other jurisdictions, such as
England and Wales, have a divided legal profession with solicitors,
barristers, and numerous other kinds of legal professionals. 27 In some
jurisdictions, the term lawyer refers only to those who appear before a court
and does not include those who do transactional, advice-based work that
U.S. readers might consider to be the practice of law. 28 Indeed, when
jurisdictions want to “recognize” the rights of foreign lawyers to practice,
one of the first hurdles they must overcome is determining who would be
considered a lawyer in their home country. 29 Despite the inherent
weaknesses of this Article in speaking about “global lawyers” and “global
lawyer regulation,” the authors believe it is useful to highlight some of the
legal profession’s regulatory developments that are presently taking place
around the world.
II. SIX TRENDS
A. Who Regulates Lawyers: Self-Regulation Versus Co-Regulation
One of the most pressing issues of lawyer regulation is who should
regulate lawyers. Recently, in a number of countries, authorities have
examined this issue and changed who has the primary responsibility for
SOC’YS OF EUR., COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION [hereinafter EU JUDGMENTS], available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_
upload/NTCdocument/Court_of_Justice_of_1_1302595800.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and
Counselors-at-Law, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520 (2011).
27. See, e.g., Approved Regulators, supra note 16.
28. See Council for Trade in Services, Legal Services: Background Note by the
Secretariat, S/C/W/43, at 2–4 (July 6, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/w43.doc (discussing the WTO legal services classification system,
the United Nations CPC classification system, and the fact that in many jurisdictions, only
those who appear in court need to be licensed lawyers).
29. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: The
Importance of Infrastructure and the Need to Create a Global Lawyer Regulatory Umbrella
Organization, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming). This article suggests that an umbrella
organization could help jurisdictions determine, for recognition purposes, who is a “lawyer”
in their home country. For examples of instruments that identify who is a “lawyer” in
another country, see Directive 98/5/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
February 1998 to Facilitate Practice of the Profession of Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a
Member State Other than that in Which the Qualification Was Obtained, 1998 O.J. (L 77)
36, at arts. (1)–(2); see also Professions Approved by the SRA for RFL Status, SOLIC. REG.
AUTHORITY (July 21, 2011), http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/regulatory-framework/professionsapproved-by-SRA-for-RFL-status.page.
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regulating lawyers. One of the most common ways to describe some of the
differences in approach is to contrast a “self-regulatory” approach with the
concept of “co-regulation.”
Much has been written and could be written about what it means to be a
“profession.” 30 Terence Johnson, for example, described many different
theories of professionalism and concluded that “[a] profession is not, then,
an occupation but a means of controlling an occupation.”31 Professions
traditionally are viewed as having a shared body of knowledge often
imparted in an institutional setting that certifies competence and quality.32
Moreover, entry into professions is conditioned upon the demonstration of
sufficient skill in applying the core knowledge, and professions selfregulate to ensure competent and ethical performance. 33 Entry into
professions may also be conditioned upon the performance of public
service. 34 Richard Abel has described professions in somewhat different
terms, citing attributes such as the profession’s control over entry, control
over the market, the creation of demand, and professional associations.35
Whatever definition is used, however, it is clear that “lawyers” are among
the groups that traditionally have been viewed as a “profession.”
The legal profession, similar to other professions, has traditionally played
a large, if not exclusive, role in regulating itself. 36 The traditional view is
that the legal profession is a “self-regulated” profession. 37 Indeed, as noted
30. See generally TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972); PROFESSIONAL
COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER (Yves Dezalay & David Sugarman eds., 1995);
PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983)
[hereinafter PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES].
31. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 45.
32. See, e.g., Nancy Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 487, 494 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005) (citing ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION
OF EXPERT LABOR (1988)); PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES, supra note 30.
33. Welsh, supra note 32, at 494; PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES, supra
note 30.
34. Steve Mark, Legal Servs. Comm’r, N.S.W. Office of the Legal Servs. Comm’r,
Keynote Address at the Australian Academy of Law Symposium 2008: Re-imaging
Lawyering: Whither the Profession? 4 (July 25, 2008), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.
gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/AALS_Keynoteaddress_July08.doc/$file/AALS_Ke
ynoteaddress_July08.doc.
35. 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 123–85 (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); see also Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, in
2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 1, 8–9 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C.
Lewis eds., 1988) (noting that many theoretical works have been informed by the framework
set by critical sociology and economics, including works by Larson and Freidson).
36. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & Bruce A. Green, Some Realism About Bar
Associations, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (2008); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,
34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of
a Modern Legal Ethics Code, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989), reprinted in LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
37. See, e.g., Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of SelfRegulation—Canada Between the United States and the English/Australian Experience,
2008 J. PROF. LAW. 87, 87–88.
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below, many lawyers around the world still describe the profession in this
fashion. 38 Before turning to the recent changes, however, it is worth noting
that the term “self-regulation” can be misleading—both empirically and
because the term “self-regulation” is ambiguous and means different things
to different people.
On the empirical side, the groundbreaking Lawyers in Society book series
edited by Richard Abel and Philip Lewis demonstrates the many different
ways that lawyers are regulated. 39 While many different countries use
many different models of regulations, there are few if any countries where
lawyers are completely self-regulated without any oversight, direction, or
limits from other sources such as the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches of government. 40 Thus, despite the fact that it has become
common to speak of the relatively recent trend from legal profession selfregulation to co-regulation, 41 it is important to realize that for decades, if
not centuries, the legal profession has not been entirely self-regulated.
The traditional view of “self-regulation” is also misleading because of the
ambiguity of the term. Consider for example, some of the differing ways
that lawyers from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—
which are all English-speaking, common-law based jurisdictions—interpret
the term “self-regulation.” In the United States, it is common to hear
lawyers speak of their “self-regulatory” system. If asked to explain, they
often will respond that the system is self-regulatory because the judicial
branch of government, rather than the executive or legislative branch,
primarily regulates U.S. lawyers. 42 Paul Paton has written that the
Canadian legal profession has more “self-regulation” than that of the United
States, United Kingdom, or Australia, because Canadian lawyers are
primarily regulated by their law societies, which are composed of
lawyers. 43 Some U.S. commentators might disagree, however, because the
authority of the Canadian law societies is based on legal profession acts

38. See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text; see also APEC Legal Services
Initiative Inventory, ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.legalservices.apec.org/
inventory/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); ELIXIR, http://elixir.bham.ac.uk/menu/
country/default.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (funded by the European Commission, this
website collects information about lawyer regulation); Legal Professions, EUR. E-JUST.
PORTAL, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_legal_professions-29-en.do (last visited Apr. 21,
2012).
40. See supra notes 8–29 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195, 195 (2010) (noting that the decline of professional control and
privilege coincides with economic and social change, including the drive of the capitalist
state toward consumerism and commodification).
42. Cf. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201A TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
cpr/mjp/201a.authcheckdam.pdf. This recommendation, which was adopted as MJP
Recommendation #1, states: “RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association affirms its
support for the principle of state judicial regulation of the practice of law.” Id.
43. See Paton, supra note 37, at 116–18.
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enacted by the Canadian provincial and territorial legislatures.44 A number
of European lawyers do not consider a system to be self-regulatory unless
lawyers are regulated by their bar association; as a result, they view the
court-based U.S. system as something other than self-regulation. In short,
different individuals from different cultures will view “self-regulation” very
differently.
Although definitions vary, this Article can point to a number of highprofile examples of movement away from self-regulation and toward coregulation. For example, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Scotland
have all adopted a co-regulatory approach. 45 In each jurisdiction, oversight
authority is placed in an alternate body. In the United Kingdom and
Scotland, a regulatory board with a nonlawyer majority and a nonlawyer
chair maintains oversight. 46 In Australia, regulatory oversight is largely
placed with statutory bodies such as Commissions or Boards.47 As
Australia moves closer toward establishing a national regulatory system,
oversight will be solidified by the creation of a proposed national legal
services board that would include nonlawyer members and a National Legal
Services Commissioner who may or may not be a lawyer. 48 Another
example of this trend is an article from this colloquium that calls for
movement toward a co-regulatory system. 49
When speaking about the question of “who regulates,” it is worth noting
that to the extent the legal profession is involved in the regulation, there is
increased interest in ensuring that it is a regulatory entity rather than a
representational entity that is involved in regulation. Thus, for example,
antitrust authorities in a number of jurisdictions have been interested in
44. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (Can.). For additional information
about the Canadian legal profession acts, see Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2703–
07.
45. See generally Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (Austl.); Legal Services Act, 2007,
c. 29 (U.K.); Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1; COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN
GOV’TS, NATIONAL LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM, DRAFT LEGAL PROFESSION NATIONAL LAW
(May 31, 2011) [hereinafter COAG DRAFT NATIONAL LAW], available at
http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/Lawlink/Corporate/ll_corporate.nsf/vwFiles/Legal_Profession_N
ational_Law.pdf/$file/Legal_Profession_National_Law.pdf. For additional information, see
Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2712 n.137.
46. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pts. 2–11 (U.K.).
47. For example, in New South Wales, the Legal Services Commissioner co-regulates
the legal profession together with the Law Society and the Bar Association. See About Us,
N.S.W. OFF. LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/
ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_aboutus [hereinafter N.S.W. About Us] (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
The same is true in Queensland. See Our People and Organisational Structure, LEGAL
SERVICES COMMISSION, http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/about-the-commission/our-people-andorganisational-structure (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Finally, in Victoria, the legal profession
is regulated by the Legal Services Commissioner, together with the Legal Services Board,
the Law Institute of Victoria, and the Bar Association. See About Us, LEGAL SERVICES
COMMISSIONER, http://www.lsc.vic.gov.au/cms.php?user=legalservicesvic;doc=Home;page=
;pageID=193 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
48. See COAG DRAFT NATIONAL LAW, supra note 45.
49. See Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2761 (2012).
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making sure that the “regulatory” and “representation” arms of professional
associations are separate. 50 This is one of the reasons why, in the United
Kingdom, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Bar Standards Board
were created; their creation ensured that the regulatory bodies would be
separate from the Law Society of England and Wales and the Bar Council,
which are the representational entities.51
In addition to the move from a more self-regulatory system toward a coregulatory system, the legal profession increasingly is regulated by others
who are not part of a co-regulatory system. 52 Sometimes these regulators
take a very different approach than has traditionally been used to regulate
the legal profession. 53 This development has been referred to as the new
“Service Providers” paradigm. 54 For example, governments around the
world are interested in harnessing the power of the legal profession in their
fight against money laundering and terrorism. Many countries have
adopted or endorsed recommendations that require lawyers to report
suspicious activity by the lawyers’ own clients and to do so without
notifying the client.55 These recommendations, which some countries have
implemented, are at odds with the lawyer-confidentiality rules in many
Government antitrust authorities, who are increasingly
countries. 56
50. See generally COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS OF EUR., CCBE POSITION ON
REGULATORY AND REPRESENTATIVE FUNCTIONS OF BARS (June 2005), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/ccbe_position_on_reg1_1182254
709.pdf; Laurel S. Terry, The European Commission Project Regarding Competition in
Professional Services, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2009) (discussing EU, OECD, and
Canadian reports that focused on this issue).
51. See, e.g., BAR STANDARDS BD., THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE REGULATION OF THE BAR IN ENGLAND AND WALES CONSULTATION PAPER 1 (Feb. 2008),
available at http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1390704/legal_services_act_2007_
regulation_implications.pdf (“This consultation paper is issued by the Bar Standards
Board . . . . The Board was established in January 2006 to regulate in the public interest.”);
About Us, B. COUNCIL, http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about-us (last visited Apr. 21, 2012)
(“The Bar Council represents barristers in England and Wales.”); How We Work, SOLIC.
REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2012);
LAW SOC’Y ENG. & WALES, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/home.law (last visited Apr. 21,
2012); What We Do, B. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/aboutbar-standards-board/what-we-do/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (“We regulate barristers called
to the Bar in England and Wales in the public interest.”) .
52. See generally Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to
the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499
(2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 2009 term, which included approximately thirteen
cases raising issues relevant to lawyer regulation); Leubsdorf, supra note 13 (citing
numerous examples of federal regulation of lawyers).
53. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 23, at 10 (summarizing FATF developments).
54. See Terry, supra note 13, at 189–93.
55. See Terry, supra note 23, at 24–27 (summarizing IBA data about country
implementation of the FATF recommendations); see also Laurel Terry, Transformative Law:
The Impact of International Law on Lawyer Regulation: A Case Study Focusing on the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/presentations%20for%20webpage/Terry_FATF
_AALS_%202010.pdf (slides presented at AALS Annual Meeting).
56. Countries that are grappling with the impact of the FATF recommendations on the
legal profession include, inter alia, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., Anti-money Laundering, LAW SOC’Y ENG. & WALES,
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interested in scrutinizing lawyer regulation, provide another example of
such non-traditional regulators.57
Although this Article does not examine in-depth the regulatory system in
every jurisdiction in the world, we submit that “self-regulation” and
independence have been a fundamental part of lawyers’ self-identity for
many decades, if not centuries. Consider, for example, some of the
resolutions of the International Bar Association (IBA), which is one of two
general-purpose global bar associations that regularly address lawyer
regulation issues. 58 The IBA Council represents more than 200 bar
associations and law societies. 59 In 1998, the IBA adopted what has come
to be known as its “core values” resolution. This resolution sets forth the
attributes that members should ensure were not compromised by the
ongoing World Trade Organization negotiations, including the need for “an
independent legal profession.” 60 The IBA’s 2006 General Principles of the
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/productsandservices/antimoneylaundering.page (last updated
Feb. 23, 2012); Anti-Money Laundering: Information for the Profession, LAW COUNCIL
AUSTR., http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/information/for-the-profession/aml.cfm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012); Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, FED’N L.
SOCIETIES CAN., http://www.flsc.ca/en/model-rules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terroristfinancing/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Money Laundering, U.S. DEPT. TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Money-Laundering.
aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession,
ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/pages/TaskForce.html
(last
visited Apr. 21, 2012). For additional information, see the FATF Symposium which is
reprinted on the Anti-Money Laundering Forum of the International Bar Association (IBA)
website. 2010 FATF Symposium, IBA ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING F., http://www.antimoneylaundering.org/2010_FATF_Symposium.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). The
symposium included articles about FATF implementation in Canada, the EU, the United
Kingdom, and a number of developing countries. See id.
57. See OECD, COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS 11–12 (2007),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/38/40080343.pdf. This report built on the
work of a prior report that addressed professional services in general, rather than legal
services specifically. See OECD, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 2 (1999),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/1920231.pdf. For additional information,
see Terry, supra note 50, at 4–10; Laurel S. Terry, EU Competition Developments (Apr. 17,
2008), http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/presentations for webpage/Terry_EU_
Competition_Georgetown.pdf.
58. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers, GATS, and the WTO Accountancy Disciplines:
The History of the WTO’s Consultation, the IBA GATS Forum and the September 2003 IBA
Resolutions, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 695, 714–21 (2004) (describing various IBA
resolutions and the IBA’s role vis-à-vis the World Trade Organization).
59. About the IBA, INT’L B. ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/About_the_IBA/About_the_
IBA.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
60. See IBA Resolution on Deregulating the Legal Profession 1 (1998), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=4094F728-9035-4C6C8AB6-DE645546D26C. This resolution stated:
[T]he Council of the International Bar Association, considering that the legal
profession nevertheless fulfils a special function in society, distinguishing it from
other service providers, in particular with regard to:
· its role in facilitating the administration of and guaranteeing access to, justice
and upholding the rule of law,
· its duty to keep client matters confidential,
· its duty to avoid conflicts of interest,
· the upholding of general and specific ethical and professional standards,
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Legal Profession began by citing the importance of the independence of the
legal profession. 61 In a similar vein, the first principle found in the 2006
Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession is
independence and the ninth and last principle is “the self-regulation of the
legal profession.” 62 Even the United Nations’ Statement on Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers includes principles that arguably endorse
certain aspects of self-regulation. 63 Similar sentiments of independence are
· its duty, in the public interest, of securing its independence, professionally,
politically and economically, from any influence affecting its service,
· its duty to the Courts
HEREBY RESOLVES
1 that the preservation of an independent legal profession is vital and
indispensable for guaranteeing human rights, access to justice, the rule of law and
a free and democratic society and
2 that any steps taken with a view to deregulating the legal profession should
respect and observe the principles outlined above.
Id. at 1.
61. INT’L B. ASS’N, IBA GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (Sept. 20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=
E067863F-8F42-41D8-9F48-D813F25F793C (“A lawyer shall maintain and be afforded
protection of independence to allow him or her to give his or her clients unbiased advice or
representation. A lawyer shall exercise his or her independent, unbiased professional
judgment upon advising his or her client as to the likelihood of success of the client’s case
and upon the client’s representation.”).
62. See COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS OF EUR., CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE
EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS 4 (2010),
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_Code_of_
conductp1_1306748215.pdf.
63. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, at 118, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990). These Principles include the following:
Whereas professional associations of lawyers have a vital role to play in
upholding professional standards and ethics, protecting their members from
persecution and improper restrictions and infringements, providing legal services
to all in need of them, and co-operating with governmental and other institutions in
furthering the ends of justice and public interest,
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, set forth below, which have been
formulated to assist Member States in their task of promoting and ensuring the
proper role of lawyers, should be respected and taken into account by
Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice and
should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as
judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and the legislature, and the public in
general. These principles shall also apply, as appropriate, to persons who exercise
the functions of lawyers without having the formal status of lawyers. . . .
24. Lawyers shall be entitled to form and join self-governing professional
associations to represent their interests, promote their continuing education and
training and protect their professional integrity. The executive body of the
professional associations shall be elected by its members and shall exercise its
functions without external interference. . . .
26. Codes of professional conduct for lawyers shall be established by the legal
profession through its appropriate organs, or by legislation, in accordance with
national law and custom and recognized international standards and norms. . . .
28. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers shall be brought before an
impartial disciplinary committee established by the legal profession, before an
independent statutory authority, or before a court, and shall be subject to an
independent judicial review.
Id. at 119–23.
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also found in the Turin Principles of Professional Conduct for the Legal
Profession in the 21st Century of the Union Internationale Des Avocats, and
in the Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing Before
International Courts and Tribunals drafted by the International Law
Association. 64
While self-regulation arguably has been a part of the lawyer’s self
identity in many countries, the legal profession has also been aware of
historic as well as recent challenges to that concept. As John Flood has
written, “When we look at the histories of professions, their existence
seems to be one of tension and struggle with the state. Are they
monopolies? Are their practices in the public interest? Do they extract
rents? Should they self-regulate?” 65 These issues have been debated over
the years, but perhaps for the legal profession never as vigorously as within
the last decade. 66 Thus, one of the six trends identified in this Article is the
global focus on the question of who should regulate lawyers.
B. What (and Whom) Is Regulated
Another important issue facing lawyers, their regulators, and the public is
who and/or what should be regulated. Should regulators be regulating
lawyers or “legal work”? A regulator might see its primary obligation as
the regulation of certain licensed individuals or entities. For example, the
the Solicitors Regulation Authority sees its role as regulating solicitors and
the firms in which they work, but not barristers or other types of legal
professionals unless they are part of a solicitor’s firm. 67 Alternatively, a
regulator might see its role as regulating “legal work.” In Australia, for
example, laws regulating the legal profession in the states and territories
prohibit a person from “engaging in legal practice” for a fee or reward when
they are not entitled to do so. 68 The law does not define what it means by
64. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 3 (Sept. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/90B50C71-23D6-4366-B5E488C
89D96559A; UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS, TURIN PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (Oct. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.uianet.org/documents/qquia/resolutions/Professional%20Conduct%20
for%20the%20Legal%20Profession%20in%20the%2021st.pdf.
65. John Flood, Reclaiming Professional Identity, JOHN FLOOD’S RANDOM ACAD.
THOUGHTS (Dec. 1, 2009, 5:36 PM), http://johnflood.blogspot.com/2009/12/reclaimingprofessional-identity.html.
66. See generally Terry, supra note 50; see also Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at
2691–94 nn.19–37 and accompanying text (citing studies).
67. See generally FAQs: Legal Services Act and ABSs, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/faqs/faqs.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
Entity-based regulation began in July 2010.
68. Section 14 of the N.S.W. Legal Profession Act 2004 provides as follows:
14 Prohibition on engaging in legal practice when not entitled
(1) A person must not engage in legal practice in this jurisdiction unless the person
is an Australian legal practitioner.
Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to engaging in legal practice of the following
kinds:
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“engaging in legal practice.” The concept of regulating “legal work” rather
than lawyers has always been fraught with difficulty for regulators. Today
nonlawyers are able to perform tasks that were traditionally reserved for
lawyers, creating confusion in the marketplace and difficulty for legal
regulators. In Australia, the move to allow the incorporation of legal
practices permits regulators to oversee multidisciplinary practices,
including nonlawyers (such as accountants, real estate agents, and financial
planners), where at least one legal practitioner-director must be appointed to
take responsibility for ensuring that the practice as a whole is compliant
with the requirements of the legislation regulating lawyers. 69 This can be

(a) legal practice engaged in under the authority of a law of this jurisdiction or
of the Commonwealth,
(b) legal practice engaged in by an incorporated legal practice in accordance
with Part 2.6 (Incorporated legal practices and multi-disciplinary partnerships),
(c) the practice of foreign law by an Australian-registered foreign lawyer in
accordance with Part 2.7 (Legal practice by foreign lawyers),
(d) legal practice engaged in by a complying community legal centre,
(e) conveyancing work carried out in accordance with a licence in force under
the Conveyancers Licensing Act 2003,
(f) (Repealed)
(g) the drawing of instruments by an officer or employee in the service of the
Crown (including the Public Service) in the course of his or her duty,
(h) legal practice of a kind prescribed by the regulations.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) a person who as an employee provides legal services to his or her employer
or a related entity if he or she:
(i) so acts in the ordinary course of his or her employment, and
(ii) receives no fee, gain or reward for so acting other than his or her ordinary
remuneration as an employee, or
(b) a person or class of persons declared by the regulations to be exempt from
the operation of subsection (1).
(4) A person is not entitled to recover any amount in respect of anything the person
did in contravention of subsection (1) and must repay any amount so received to
the person from whom it was received.
(5) A person may recover from another person, as a debt due to the person, any
amount the person paid to the other person in respect of anything the other person
did in contravention of subsection (1).
(6) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the application (with
or without specified modifications) of provisions of this Act to persons engaged in
legal practice of a kind referred to in subsection (2) (other than subsection (2) (b)–
(f)) or persons referred to in subsection (3).
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 14 (Austl.).
69. Since July 1, 2001, New South Wales legal service providers have been permitted to
incorporate and provide legal services to clients either alone, or alongside other service
providers who may, or may not be, legal practitioners. Such Incorporated Legal Practices
(ILP) can operate, provided the ILP has at least one legal practitioner director and complies
with the requirements of the Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices)
Act 2000 and the Legal Profession Regulation 2005. Such provisions have been
incorporated into the Legal Profession Act 2004 and Regulations. See Legal Profession Act
2004 (NSW) s 140. Legal practitioner-directors must also comply with their obligations as a
company director under the Corporations Act 2001. See id. s 140(6). Similar legislation
exists in other states and territories in Australia. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT)
pt 2.6; Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) pt 2.6; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) pt 2.7; Legal
Profession Act 2007 (Tas) pt 2.5; Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) pt 2.7; Legal Practice Act
2003 (WA) ss 45–74. All of these jurisdictions have identical legislation to that in New
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seen as a small step toward the regulation broadly of “legal work” rather
than specifically of lawyers. 70
When evaluating what the regulator seeks to regulate—individuals or
services—one must take cognizance of the impact of the lawyer monopoly
or unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules in the jurisdiction. If a
jurisdiction has a narrow monopoly, its regulators may seek to regulate far
fewer activities (or individuals) than a jurisdiction that has a broader
definition of the lawyer’s monopoly. For example, England and Wales
have a fairly narrow list of things they consider to be “reserved tasks” or
falling within the solicitor’s monopoly. 71 Consequently, the who and what
of regulation in England and Wales is fairly narrow.
The situation in the United States is considerably different. Because the
U.S. concept of UPL is much broader than in the United Kingdom, the
United States regulates more broadly with respect to who and what. As a
result, one sees UPL lawsuits in the United States that one would not see in
the United Kingdom, including lawsuits against publishers and against
websites offering form preparation. 72 But regardless of whether a
jurisdiction defines the monopoly broadly or narrowly, so long as it
regulates providers rather than services and there is a monopoly, the
regulator will have to grapple with UPL issues.
The Law Society of Upper Canada provides an example of a regulator
that seems interested in regulating legal services as well as lawyers.
Accordingly, it has now brought paralegals under its regulatory ambit. 73
Even if a regulator decides to regulate providers, rather than services, it
must decide whether to regulate entities as well as individuals. For
example, other than New York and New Jersey, which discipline law firms
and individual lawyers, U.S. states only regulate individual lawyers.74 The
U.K. SRA, on the other hand, regulates entities.75
South Wales permitting incorporation, and have adopted the same self-assessment program
designed and introduced there.
70. Steve Mark, “What Is Legal Work?—A Regulator’s View” (Mar. 20–24, 2005),
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/What%20is%
20Legal%20Work%20LawAsia%20Paper.doc/$file/What%20is%20Legal%20Work%20La
wAsia%20Paper.doc (paper presented at the LAWASIAdownunder2005 Conference).
71. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 12 (U.K.) (meaning of “reserved legal
activity” and “legal activity”).
72. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech. Inc., 179 F.3d 956,
956 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating the District Court’s injunction banning Quicken Family
Lawyer after the Texas Legislature amended its 1939 unauthorized practice of law statute);
Karen McMahan, State Bar Claims LegalZoom Practices Law Without a License: Online
Document Provider Says Bar Is Blocking Its Business Illegally, CAROLINA J. ONLINE (Nov.
21, 2011), http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=8498.
73. See Resources for Paralegals, LAW SOC’Y UPPER CAN., http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/jsp/home/
paralegalindex.jsp (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
74. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2011) (“Misconduct, A lawyer or
law firm shall not . . . .”); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2011) (“Every law firm,
government entity, and organization authorized by the Court Rules to practice law in this
jurisdiction shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that member lawyers or lawyers
otherwise participating in the organization’s work undertake measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”); N.J. CT. R. 1:201(a) (“Every attorney and business entity authorized to practice law in the State of New
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An additional question that regulators now face is how to define their
regulatory authority in a world in which lawyers are increasingly seen as
“consultants,” and nonlawyers are consulted on issues that might be viewed
as legal services. 76 As Jordan Furlong has pointed out, legal regulators are
increasingly going to have to grapple with this question of who and what
they regulate. 77 The question whether they are regulating individuals or
services was less important in the past because there was a more perfect
overlap between lawyers and legal services. Legal services were what
lawyers provided. Today, however, there is much less overlap; lawyers no
longer dominate the “legal services” market the way they once did.78 The
legal profession is no longer the “only game in town,” so regulators now
must consider whether and how to respond to nonlawyer, nontraditional
legal services providers. Should regulators try to regulate paralegals,
software providers such as Intuit (Willmaker), and internet sites such as
LegalZoom? The issue of who or what should be regulated is one that
many regulators have faced, or will face, regardless of their location.
C. When Lawyers Are Regulated: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
A third development in the field of lawyer regulation has to do with
timing and the point at which regulators should become involved with
lawyers. The traditional approach to lawyer regulation and enforcement is
to wait until a lawyer violates a regulatory provision and then impose some
sort of penalty. 79 In the United States, disciplinary authorities typically
wait until a lawyer violates (or is alleged to have violated) a rule of
professional conduct before stepping in. 80 At that point, it is not
Jersey, including those attorneys specially authorized for a limited purpose or in connection
with a particular proceeding, shall be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as set forth in the Constitution of 1947, Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 3.”).
75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 640 (2002); Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law
Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1398 (2006).
77. See, e.g., Jordan Furlong, Transformation: Five Catalysts at Work in the Canadian
Legal Services Marketplace, 2010 Semi-annual Conference Federation of Law Societies of
Canada, at 7 (Mar. 19, 2010) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
78. Id. at 3. As Mr. Furlong advised Canadian regulators, they will have to decide
whether they are regulating the current providers or whether they want to regulate the legal
services market. Some Canadian provincial regulators have extended their regulatory reach
beyond lawyers. Id. at 7–8. The Law Society of Upper Canada, for example, regulates
paralegals as well as lawyers. See id. at 8; Resources for Paralegals, supra note 73. Not all
Canadian provinces or territories have taken this approach, however.
79. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 9(1)
(2002) (“It shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to: (1) violate or attempt to violate
the [State Rules of Professional Conduct], or any other rules of this jurisdiction regarding
professional conduct of lawyers; (2) engage in conduct violating applicable rules of
professional conduct of another jurisdiction . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., id.; Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures
in the United States, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 359, 379–81; Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations,
Self-Regulation and Consumer Protection: Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53,
58–59.
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uncommon for U.S. disciplinary authorities to impose requirements that are
intended to be proscriptive and help the lawyer avoid future mistakes.81
Although there is some ex ante regulation in the United States, such as
random trust account audits and mandatory continuing legal education
requirements, U.S. regulators do not generally intervene until a disciplinary
violation occurs.
In contrast to this primarily ex post approach to lawyer regulation, some
regulators, in an effort to prevent lawyer mistakes and misconduct, are
increasingly turning to ex ante regulation and enforcement. For example,
several Australian states and territories now rely extensively on this type of
ex ante approach. The New South Wales Legal Profession Act 2004
requires that legal practitioner-directors ensure the incorporated practice has
“appropriate management systems” to render the practice compliant with
the Act. 82 The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC) has
used this “appropriate management systems” concept to develop an ex ante
approach to regulation. After consultation with various stakeholders, the
OLSC developed a list of ten objectives that an “appropriate management
system” should address. 83 The OLSC requires that each incorporated
practice conduct a “self-assessment” to determine its level of compliance
with these objectives.84 For each of these objectives, the OLSC has
developed guidelines. For example, objective five relates to costs
disclosure and billing. 85 The self-assessment form identifies key concepts
that practitioners might want to consider when determining their
compliance with objective five. The key concepts include:
The use of established new client engagement procedures including
universal use of approved retainer/costs agreements.
Standardised procedures for collecting client data, opening of new files
and the recording of data within the firm’s accounting and practice
management systems with provision for separate client records in the case
of multi-disciplinary practices. 86

The self-assessment document then provides additional examples of what
an incorporated legal practice (ILP) may do to demonstrate compliance.
For example, the self-assessment form suggests practitioners may want to
use a “disclosure policy (e.g. whether or not taking advantage of exceptions
to disclosure, policy about disclosure of costs of non-legal services used in
the legal matter) with a process ensuring disclosure is made in accordance
81. See, e.g., Nancy McCarthy, Lawyers Go Back to School to Brush Up on Their
Ethical Duties, CAL. B.J. (May 2011), http://www.calbarjournal.com/May2011/
TopHeadlines/TH2.aspx. See generally Maute, supra note 80.
82. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 140(3) (Austl.).
83. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R, CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS OF
“APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS” FOR INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES IN NSW
[hereinafter SELF-ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT], available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/ILP%20self%20assessment%20form.doc/$file/ILP%20self
%20assessment%20form.doc.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6–7; see also Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 140(3).
86. See SELF-ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT, supra note 83, at 6–7.
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with the Act, Rules and Regulation.” 87 The self-assessment document also
suggests “[a]n up to date File/Matter Register or Practice Management
system listing files and individual client files.”88 Queensland’s approach is
identical. 89
The impetus for creating this framework derives from OLSC’s
philosophical stance that their function and the purpose of regulating legal
practitioners is to reduce complaints against lawyers within a paradigm of
consumer protection and protection of the rule of law. 90 To this end, the
OLSC has adopted an “education towards compliance” framework to work
with the profession rather than against them in entrenching an ethical
culture and promoting professionalism, while reducing complaints. So,
when the OLSC receives a complaint against a lawyer, their first response,
where possible and appropriate, is not to prosecute the lawyer but to work
with him or her to determine the underlying basis of the complaint.
The switch to an ex ante approach has produced impressive results. In
New South Wales, ILPs experienced a sharp drop in complaints against
them after implementation of the proactive “appropriate management
systems” approach. 91 The experience in Queensland was similar. 92
The Australian experiences are one reason why there has been global
interest in proscriptive, or ex ante, systems of lawyer regulation and
enforcement and why Australian regulators regularly are asked to share
their experiences with others.93 For example, some members of the ABA
87. Id.
88. Id. at 6.
89. See LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES SELF ASSESSMENT
AUDIT, available at http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/97781/ilp-initialself-assessment-audit-form.pdf.
90. Steve Mark, Regulation for Professionalism, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, (N.S.W. Office of
the Legal Servs. Comm’r, Sydney, Austl.), June 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/WP_Issue50_June2010.pdf/
$file/WP_Issue50_June2010.pdf.
91. A 2008 study by the OLSC and Dr. Christine Parker, of the University of
Melbourne, showed that on average, the complaint rate (average number of complaints per
practitioner per years) for ILPs after self-assessment was two thirds lower than the complaint
rate before self-assessment. See Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve Mark, Regulating
Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of
the Legal Profession in New South Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC. 466, 485 (2010).
92. See John Briton & Scott McLean, Lawyer Regulation, Consciousness-Raising and
Social Science 10–11 (July 15–17, 2010), available at http://www.lsc.qld.
gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/106069/lawyer-reg-consciousness-raising-and-socialscience.pdf (paper presented at International Legal Ethics Conference IV, Stanford Law
School).
93. For examples of the many places in which Australian regulators have been asked to
share their experiences with others, see STEVE MARK, N.S.W. OFF. LEGAL SERVICES
COMMISSIONER, REGULATING FOR PROFESSIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH WALES APPROACH
AND KEEPING PACE WITH THE EVOLVING PRACTICE OF LAW (Sept. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/Regulating_for_Professiona
lism_ABA_Conference_August2010.pdf/$file/Regulating_for_Professionalism_ABA_Confe
rence_August2010.pdf; Briton and McLean, supra note 92; Steve Mark, Before and After,
LAW MGMT., Nov. 2010, at 30, 30–31, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/
olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/Law_Mgt_Mag_article.pdf/$file/Law_Mgt_Mag_article.pdf; Steve
Mark et al., Preserving the Ethics and Integrity of the Legal Profession in an Evolving
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Commission on Ethics 20/20 have seemed interested in the issue of whether
the United States should move toward a more proscriptive system of lawyer
regulation. Thus, the question of when to regulate is one that regulators are
frequently asked to address.
D. Where Lawyers Are Regulated: Geographically Versus Virtually
In addition to the who-what-when issues noted above, lawyer regulators
increasingly face questions about where activities occur and which
activities fall within their regulatory jurisdiction. These are particularly
difficult issues because the legal profession seems to be in the midst of a
Copernican revolution.
Historically, the legal profession and its regulators were defined by
geography. Lawyers practiced in one geographic area, and the regulators
with jurisdiction over those lawyers were located in the same geographic
area. As technology developed, lawyers were no longer confined to a single
area, and regulators expanded their authority with them. Today, even
though the legal profession is no longer bound by geography, the regulatory
system is still primarily defined by geography because the primary
regulators are associated with a specific geographic political entity. The
size of the geographic political entity may vary, but geography is a defining
trait. Thus, the United States, Canada, and Australia all have subnational
regulators designated by states, provinces, or territories, whereas the legal
professions in other jurisdictions may be regulated on a national or more
local basis. 94 Although there is some thematic admission and regulation
(for example, admission to practice before the International Criminal Court
or the European Patent Office),95 the primary source of authority and
regulation continues to be geographic.
As a legal profession and as a society, we have not yet worked out this
mismatch between the virtual practice world and our physically defined
regulatory world. Some doubt this mismatch exists, pointing to the local
nature of many lawyers’ practices. But even if it is true that most lawyers
practice alone or in small firms serving local clients on primarily local
matters, there is still a mismatch between practice and reality. Why? Even
these lawyers who have an essentially local practice probably take
Market: A Comparative Regulatory Response, available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/UK_paper.doc/$file/UK_paper.doc (presented at Regulating
and Deregulating Lawyers in the 21st Century, June 3–4, 2010, London, England). See
generally Speeches and Papers, N.S.W. OFF. LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER,
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_speeches (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012).
94. Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2703, 2715–19.
95. See, e.g., International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICCASP/1/3, Rule 22 (adopted Sept. 3–10, 2002), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_
Evidence_English.pdf; Counsel Authorised to Act Before the Court, INT’L CRIM. COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Defence/Counsel/ (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012); Admittance and Enro[l]lment, EUR. PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/
learning-events/eqe/admission.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
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advantage of the “unbounded” virtual ways to practice law—they may
return a client call on a cell phone while on vacation and without the client
knowing that the lawyer is not in the office, or they may answer emails
from anywhere in the world without the client realizing that they are not
down the street. Lawyer regulators, however, have not had the same
amount of freedom to escape the limits of geography. Thus, one of the
current issues facing regulators is how to reconcile the realities of virtual
law practice with the traditional regulatory approach in which their
authority was framed in geography-based terms. One should expect to see
continued discussions of where lawyers should be regulated and where
regulators have jurisdictional authority.
E. How Lawyers Are Regulated:
Outcomes-Based Regulation Versus Rules
Another trend in lawyer regulation is increased interest in the issues
related to the method of regulation or how one regulates. One example of
this interest is the increased discussion about whether a single regulatory
approach should be used for all lawyers and all sizes of firms. In 2009, the
influential U.K. “Smedley Report” recommended differentiated types of
regulation depending on the size of the law firm and the sophistication of
the clients. 96 The issue of the desirability of “one size fits all” regulation
has been discussed in other forums. 97
Another example of the how question concerns the style of regulation.
Whether regulation should use “rules” or “standards” is not a new debate,98
but there seems to be increased interest in this topic, especially about
whether jurisdictions should adopt an “outcomes-based” or “principlesbased” approach to lawyer regulation.99 An outcomes-based approach uses
broad principles instead of detailed rules for regulation. 100
96. NICK SMEDLEY, REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE LEGAL WORK (Mar. 31,
2009), available at http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Review_of_the_Regulation_of_
Corporate_Legal_Work_03.09_.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: Professional Services—Scope for More Reform, at para. 13, COM (2005) 405 final
(Sept. 5, 2005) (“The key finding is that one-off users, who are generally individual
customers and households, may need some carefully targeted protection. On the other hand,
the main users of professional services—businesses and the public sector—may not need, or
have only very limited need of, regulatory protection given they are better equipped to
choose providers that best suit their needs. . . . The differing interests of these groups should
therefore be paramount in reviewing existing regulation and rules.”).
98. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way
of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and
Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1117 (1999).
99. See generally Outcomes-Focused Regulation at a Glance, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide.page (last updated
Oct. 10, 2011).
100. Julia Black, Martyn Hopper, & Christa Band, Making a Success of Principles-Based
Regulation, 1 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. 191, 191 (2007). For further information about
outcomes-based regulation, see RT HON LORD HUNT OF WIRRAL MBE, THE HUNT REVIEW OF
THE REGULATION OF LEGAL SERVICES (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.lawcentres.
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A number of jurisdictions have recently adopted, or have been asked to
adopt, an “outcomes-based” regulatory approach for the legal profession.
Australia adopted outcomes-based regulation for legal services in the 1990s
as part of the implementation of the legislation permitting ILPs, and it has
been included as a fundamental feature of the New South Wales system for
regulating ILPs. 101 England and Wales have also adopted outcomes-based
regulation. Lord Hunt of Wirral, in his influential 2009 review of the
regulation of U.K. legal services, recommended outcomes-based regulation
as the preferred approach for the regulation of the legal profession in the
The United Kingdom Solicitors Regulation
United Kingdom. 102
Authority’s new Handbook for solicitors that took effect on October 6,
2011 uses an outcomes-based regulatory approach. 103
Outcomes-based regulation does not mean sole reliance on principles per
se. A successful outcomes-based system recognizes that regulation is a
balancing act, and that on some occasions fixed rules may be necessary.104
It is as much about the approach of the regulator and firms as it is about the
format of regulatory requirements. For example, the Financial Services
Authority in the United Kingdom has a set of “Principles for Businesses”
and an extended set of rules and guidance which amplify the principles in
given scenarios, such as the conduct of the sale of financial services
products, handling client money, trading in securities, managing conflicts of
interest, and capital adequacy requirements.105
Outcomes-based regulation is not without its critics. For example, during
the October 2011 Fordham University School of Law colloquium on
Globalization and the Legal Profession, Professor Christopher Whelan
challenged this approach, citing the uncertainty that can be exploited by
those being regulated.106 Given the success of the Australian approach and
the influence of the U.K. Act, however, it is likely that the issue of
outcomes-based regulation will be receiving increased attention in the
org.uk/uploads/Legal_Regulation_Report_October_2009.pdf; Julia Black, Forms and
Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation (LSE Law, Soc’y & Econ. Working Papers
No.13/2008, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1267722.
101. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 140 (Austl.); see also supra notes 82–88 and
accompanying text.
102. See HUNT, supra note 100, at 9.
103. See, e.g., Outcomes-Focused Regulation at a Glance, supra note 99. The Legal
Services Board approved this Handbook on June 17, 2011. See LEGAL SERVS. BD., DECISION
NOTICE ISSUED UNDER PART 3 OF SCHEDULE 4 TO THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007, at 7 ¶¶ 41–
44 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/
regulation/pdf/rules_decision_notice_final.pdf; SRA Handbook, supra note 17; see also
Outcomes-Focused Regulation: Overview, LAW SOC’Y ENG. & WALES (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/productsandservices/practicenotes/ofroverview/4988.article.
104. Black, Hopper, & Band, supra note 100, at 200.
105. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESSES (Mar. 2012), available at
http://media.fsahandbook.info/pdf/PRIN.pdf; FSA Handbook, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY,
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
106. Professor Whelan advises us that his oral remarks built on his prior work. See, e.g.,
DOREEN MCBARNET & CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, CREATIVE ACCOUNTING AND THE CROSSEYED JAVELIN THROWER (1999).
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future. Thus, lawyers and their regulators should expect to see continued
discussions in the future about how lawyers should be regulated.
F. Why Lawyers Are Regulated: The Use of Regulatory Objectives
and “Purpose Statements”
Despite its fundamental importance, the issue of why regulate does not
appear to have taken a visible center stage in most systems of lawyer
regulation.107 Anecdotal evidence suggests that around the world, it is
common to have lawyer regulations that do not emphasize or clearly
articulate the objectives of that regulation or its purpose.108 This is true
regardless of the type of legal instrument used to regulate lawyers and
regardless of whether lawyer regulation in that jurisdiction is based on rules
or standards, or whether it takes an ex ante or a ex post approach, and
regardless of whether it seeks to regulate activities (legal services) or
individuals (lawyers). In other words, the why variable is independent from
the other variables of who regulates, who is regulated, what conduct is
regulated, when regulation occurs, and how regulation occurs.
Although the lack of explicit regulatory objectives seems to be the global
norm, there are exceptions. For example, section 1 of the U.K. Act sets
forth eight “regulatory objectives” that must be the basis of lawyer
regulation. 109 Although there was considerable debate about what should
be included within section 1, there now appears to be a consensus that all
future legal profession regulations should advance one or more of the goals
set forth in that section. 110 In 2010, Scotland adopted a new law that
includes regulatory objectives. 111 Canada is another example of a
jurisdiction that has explicitly articulated the objectives of legal profession
regulation. 112 Unlike in the United Kingdom and Scotland, however,
Canadian objectives do not appear, for the most part, to have been subject
to vigorous debates and controversy. 113 Australia also has draft national
legislation setting out regulatory objectives that is likely to be adopted in
most Australian states and territories within the next twelve months.114
Individual Australian regulators have, on their own, also adopted purpose
statements and regulatory objective provisions.115 Other jurisdictions,
including Ireland and India, have pending draft objectives for the legal
profession. 116
107. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note
7, at 2687.
108. See id. at 2724 n.207 (citing responses to the authors’ email inquiries).
109. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.).
110. See generally Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7.
111. See Legal Services (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 16), § 1.
112. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 3, (Can.). For additional
information, see Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2703–04.
113. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2706.
114. See, e.g., COAG DRAFT NATIONAL LAW, supra note 45.
115. See, e.g., N.S.W. About Us, supra note 47; see also Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra
note 7, at 2710–12.
116. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2715–16 (citing the draft laws in India
and Ireland).

2684

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

There are a number of reasons why it is important to include regulatory
objectives in the appropriate governing instruments. Indeed, we consider
this topic so important that we have written a companion article for this
colloquium that addresses this topic in more depth. As that article explains,
regulatory objectives are useful both before and after lawyer regulation is
adopted. First, the inclusion of regulatory objectives sets out a defined
purpose of legislation and its parameters. Regulatory objectives serve as a
guide to assist those regulating the legal profession and those being
regulated. To assist those affected by the particular regulation, they identify
the purpose of the regulation and why it is enforced. Second, regulatory
objectives assist in ensuring that the function and purpose of the particular
legislation is transparent. So, when the regulatory body administering the
legislation is questioned about their interpretation of the legislation, the
regulatory body can point to the regulatory objectives to demonstrate
compliance with function and purpose. Third, regulatory objectives can
help define the parameters of the legislation and may assist in determining
the breadth and depth of legislation. Fourth, regulatory objectives may
create a better working relationship between regulatory bodies and the
profession by promoting co-operation in the production of guidelines for
how the profession should comply with the regulatory objectives and the
purpose of the legislation.
For these reasons, it should come as no surprise that in light of the
complex nature of issues set forth in this Article, regulators are increasingly
seeking the guidance that is available from regulatory objectives, and that
this is one of the trends in lawyer regulation.
CONCLUSION
One of the consequences of globalization has been new challenges and
pressures for regulators of the legal profession. The legal profession, its
regulators, and its stakeholders face a number of specific yet multifaceted,
complex, multidisciplinary, and difficult issues. As a result of globalization
and technological developments, lawyers, clients, governments, regulators,
and other stakeholders around the world can easily communicate and
transact with one another. Consequently, one must expect that ideas and
developments from one part of the world are likely to be discussed and
debated elsewhere, even if they are not ultimately adopted. In addition to
focusing on specific issues, the legal profession and its regulators should
collectively consider some of the broader thematic issues and contexts in
which these specific issues arise. Many contemporary issues are examples
of global challenges and trends to reconsider the issues of who regulates
lawyers, who or what is regulated, when regulation should occur, where it
should occur, how it should occur, and why it should occur. Accordingly, it
would be useful for all lawyers, regulators, and stakeholders to consider the
issues contained in this Article if they have not already done so.

